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Is Music Mimetic? Ricoeur and the
Limits of  Narrative
Roger W. H. Savage
There is certainly an art which is not mimetic, this is music.
Although, at the limit, could not one say that to each piece
of  art there corresponds a mood?
Paul Ricoeur
In the closing pages of  Time and Narrative, Paul Ricoeur remarks that as
narrative attempts to draw near the inscrutability of  time, it approaches
its limits. Beyond the narrative art’s capacity to refigure time, lyric poetry
“gives a voice, which is also a song”1 to a meditation on the disproportion
between the brevity and fragility of  human life and the eroding power
of  time. The lyricism of  this meditative thinking touches the
fundamental element of  our mortal existence without passing through
the narrative art. At its limit, the mood to which this lyricism gives
voice replies in its own way to the aporia of  time and its other.
The intractability of  this aporia sets in motion a reflection on
music’s mimetic relation to the fundamental experience of  our
nonmastery of  time. As the narrative genre “overflows into other genres
of  discourse that, in their own ways, undertake to speak of  time,”2 this
fundamental experience makes itself  felt beyond the limit of  narrative
configurations. The “echoes of  the sempiternal elegy” that remain
dissimulated at several places in Ricoeur’s text “under the modesty and
sobriety of  prose”3 bear witness to another transcultural form of
necessity which, like the narrative art, replies to the aporetics of
temporality. Yet unlike narrative, which for Ricoeur is an imitation of
action, this other transcultural form of  necessity redescribes poetically
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the experience of being-affected that is the mark of our finitude and
the condition of  our openness to the world.
The paradox Ricoeur attributes to the production in works
of  art of  moods and feelings that have no prior reference to the real
provides a starting-point for exploring his claim that music is an art
that is not mimetic. Ricoeur’s qualification that each piece of  art has its
mood suggests that the force of  this paradox extends beyond narrative’s
refiguration of  reality. This paradox, in which the work’s suspension
of  the real is the condition for its refiguration of  it, gives the full measure
of  mimesis. Through discovering dimensions of  experience that did
not previously exist, the work augments the real by renewing it in
accordance with itself. The further the work distances itself  from the
real, the deeper its bite. Accordingly, the truth of  the work consists in
the “capacity of  the work to break a path in the real by renewing the
real in accordance with the work.”4 By raising action above itself,
narrative’s epoché of  the real opens the way to the real’s mimetic
transfiguration. Correlatively, with the break with painting’s
representational function in the twentieth-century, the expressive
function of  the world created by a work becomes fully deployed. Ricoeur
opines that music goes further than even nonfigurative painting in its
power of  redescription. Without representing anything of  the real, a
piece of  music possesses a tone or mood that it establishes in us.5
Arnold Schoenberg’s music is exemplary in this regard: by
renouncing a tonal center, Schoenberg’s Die hängenden Garten, Erwartung
and Pierrot lunaire give expression to realms of  feeling that resonate
with the loss of  credibility of  the sense of  temporal unity imposed by
tonal closure. By dispensing with the “merely nomic generalities [of
nineteenth-century compositional practices] that hid the genuine relation
to the mood that each piece expresses,” these works reveal music’s
essential significance in much the same way as nonfigurative painting
discloses figurative art’s fundamentally mimetic character. By abolishing
the traditional requirement that dissonances resolve, Schoenberg’s
negation of  familiar means of  musical expression achieves a break
comparable to “Picasso’s nonfigurative style, where the human figure
is cut, [and] twisted.” Through abandoning the tonal conventions that
facilitate access to traditional, tonal works, each of  Schoenberg’s atonal
works achieves its communicability through its unique singularity. This
intensification of  the mood or feeling possessed by each work “forbids
any recourse to attached rules defining a priori what is to be beautiful.”6
For Ricoeur, the naked singularity of  each work’s expression of  its
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tone is what can make contemporary art so difficult to understand.
Despite the challenges it presents, Schoenberg’s music bears out the
paradox that the more a work retreats from the real, the more intense
is its return and the greater is its bite; the communicability of  the moods
or tones in Schoenberg’s expressionistic compositions augments the
real by refiguring the affective dimension of  our experiences.7
Music as Nonrepresentational Art
Ricoeur’s suggestion that Schoenberg’s music explores new
realms of feeling cuts across a long-standing problematic within the
discourse of  absolute music. Absolute music is “pure” instrumental
music that has no programmatic content or associations. Richard
Wagner used the term to justify his claim that the “total work of  art”
(Gesamtkunstwerk) represented the apogee of  the Germanic symphonic
tradition.8 According to romantic sensibilities, instrumental music’s lack
of  a concept or object signifies its freedom from, or dependence upon,
all constraining references. Consequently, its nonrepresentational status
signifies the metaphysical dignity invested in it as a “language beyond
language.” This investment in absolute music in the nineteenth century
consummates a historic reversal of  judgment in which music’s deficiency
with respect to its representational power becomes the symbol of  its
sublime ineffability. Within this schema, absolute music’s transcendence
of  reality is the correlative opposite of  its imitative, representational
function.
The Romantic reversal of  judgment stands in a long tradition
in which the idea of  absolute music supplants the principle of  music’s
mimetic dependence upon language. Carl Dahlhaus argues that by
setting music against language “as the expression of  human reason,”9
the understanding of  music that originates in antiquity lays the
cornerstone for mimetic theories. According to this understanding,
music (musikç) is the unity of  harmony (harmonia), rhythm (rhythmos)
and language (logos). Separating harmony and rhythm from language
reduces musikç to a shadow of  its quintessential nature. Seemingly
stripped of  reason, purely instrumental music becomes subordinate to
the discursive power of  language. By identifying the meaning of  purely
sonorous figurations with the imitation of  speech intonation, of  feelings
and affects, and, in the late twentieth- and twenty-first century, of  social
practices, ideological constructs and political agendas, mimetic theories
of  music redress the perceived deficiencies of  instrumental music’s
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nonrepresentational significance with substantive interpretations of  its
concrete content.
 The advent of  the seconda prattica in the early seventeenth-
century evidences the preeminence of  the humanistic intention to place
music under the logos of  ordinary speech. Through rejecting the idea
that music is an imitation of  the divine logos, Vincenzo Galilei along
with other members of  the Camarata intended to wrest music’s clarity
of  meaning from reason’s subjugation to purely sensuous displays of
sound. The monodic-harmonic style cultivated by proponents of  the
seconda prattica promoted textual clarity in accordance with the Platonic
precept that the “mode and rhythm must fit the words.”10 Through
imitating the manner of  their intonation in speech, musical
representations of  such feelings in a stile rappresentativo lay the foundation
for a theory of  musical rhetoric that dominates the Baroque doctrine
of  aesthetic affects. The representation of  affects by descending minor
seconds, tonal ambiguity, or ascending leaps, for example, identified
these musical figures with expressions of  grief  (passus duriusculus), doubt
(dubitatio) or exclamation (exclamatio). These figures’ rhetorical function
codifies the principle of  imitation advanced by the seconda prattica’s
promotion of  its humanistic ideals.
E.T.A Hoffman consecrates the reversal of  judgment that
elevates instrumental music’s poetic essence above language when, in
his review of  Beethoven’s “Fifth Symphony,” he celebrates Beethoven’s
genius in mastering the heights of  musical expression. As a “completely
romantic composer,” Beethoven’s instrumental music “discloses . . . a
world that has nothing in common with the external sensual world
that surrounds him, a world in which he leaves behind all definite feelings
to surrender himself  to an inexpressible longing.” Accordingly,
Beethoven’s symphonic work surpasses the limits of  vocal music, which
for Hoffman and his contemporaries excludes “the character of
indefinite longing, merely representing emotions defined by words as
emotions experienced in the realm of  the infinite” by means of  a
language that is immediately accessible only to feeling. Invested with
metaphysical dignity by the gnostic function of  its sublime ineffability,
absolute music gives voice to the somnambulistic power of  imagination
that evidences the vitality of  the composer’s inner psychic life.11
The romantic contention that absolute music leaves the world
behind motivates narratological interpretations that identify music’s
internal processes with extra-musical social and political agendas. By
transposing Hermann Kretzschmar’s hermeneutical methods onto a
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socio-cultural plane, musicologist Susan McClary relates the narrative
strategies she identifies with tonality and sonata form with the hegemony
of  a patriarchal order. Kretzschmar’s antipathy to Eduard Hanslick’s
formalist aesthetics prefigures McClary’s deconstructions of  absolute
music.12 In her view, absolute music only appears “to make itself  up
without reference to the outside world … [because] it adheres so
thoroughly to the most common plot outline and the most fundamental
ideological tensions available within Western culture.”13 Consequently,
the interlocking schemata of  tonality and the traditional sonata form
constitute the framework of  a master narrative that enacts a hegemonic
political agenda. The pretense of  music’s formal purity obscures the
socially constructed representations of  gender identities, sexual
promiscuity and exoticized Other that she argues coincide with the
ideological containment and marginalization of  differences. The double
gesture that confines these differences by means of  the subjugating
strategy of  absolute music’s master narrative puts the Other on display.
According to her, tonality’s discursive force frames the contagion of
the Other as an object of  surveillance and fascination. Hence, the
representation of  a substantive social content constitutes the mimetic
reproduction of  a real political agenda dissimulated by the metaphysical
pretense of  absolute music’s transcendent autonomy.
The Poetics of  Narrativity
By relegating absolute music to the ideological preserve of
the cult of  art-religion, the discourse of  absolute music effectively
eclipses music’s rootedness in experiences that demand to be expressed.
Narrativizing interpretations that identify music’s substantive content
with the emplotment of  a succession of  events evoke the specter of  a
musical hermeneutics whose methods and strategies decipher socially
encoded representations of  sexuality, gender and racial differences.
Shifting music’s imitative function onto the social plane combats the
pretense of  music’s aesthetic self-sufficiency at the expense of  music’s
capacity to invent new worlds that individual works express, thereby
eclipsing the paradox at the heart of  the poetic activity that constitutes
the work.
According to Ricoeur, “as the inversion of  ordinary language,
poetic language is not directed outwards, but inwards towards an interior,
which is nothing other than the mood structured and expressed by a
poem.” The suspension of  ordinary or ostensive references, which
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this inversion effects by redirecting a work’s reference to the world it
expresses, is the negative condition of  the work’s power to redescribe
reality. In this respect, “a poem is like a work of  music in that its mood
is exactly coextensive with the internal order of  symbols articulated by
its language.”14 There is no creative imitation of  reality apart from the
poetic activity that invents new allusions to the real by creating the
world of  the work. Mimesis and poiesis are joined together in a work
of  imagination in which the “idea” (dianoia) that a work expresses is
attributable to the synthetic operation that schematizes the “thought”
the work presents as a temporal whole.
The mediating role that plot plays foregrounds narrative’s
privileged relation to the time of  action. Moreover, the fact that
“narratives have acting and suffering as their theme”15 evinces the
anchorages of  narrative activity in the practical field of  our experiences.
By raising human action above itself, the imitation of  action in the
realm of  fiction transvalues ethical understandings of  actions, characters
and events. The poetic transformation of  human action and suffering
through stories that recount actions and events effects the mimetic
displacement of  ethics to poetics.16 This mimetic displacement of  praxis
from the ethical to the poetic realm finds its completion in fiction’s
refiguration of  the practical field of  our experiences.
Ricoeur’s contention that, of  all the arts, music is the one that
is not mimetic finds its initial justification in the claim that mimesis is
an action about action. And yet, the confession of  the limits of  narrative
indicates a place for a mode of  poiesis in which the pathos of
experiences of  passivity finds a voice. In his retrospective remarks at
the end of  Time and Narrative, he comments that the “lyricism of
meditative thinking goes right to the fundamental without passing
through the art of  narrating.”17 As the multiplication of  our experiences
of  eternity in fiction brings narrative to its limits, the fundamental
experience of  being-affected by time gives rise to other replies to the
enigma of  time and its other.18 At this limit, the evocation in music of
feelings or moods that have no prior existence in reality answers to the
aporia of  time’s inscrutability by redescribing affective dispositions that
open us to the world.
Is Music Mimetic?
The notion that this evocation of  feelings and moods is the
sign of  a Romantic sensibility, in which music’s ineffability is the index
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of  its transcendent value, occludes the horizon of  music’s ontological
vehemence. Critical strategies that unmask absolute music’s complicity
with the hegemonic representations of  gender, sexuality and exoticized
Others eclipse this paradox: a work’s distance from the real is directly
related to the bite the work exerts on it. This paradox explodes the
justificatory schema of  a form of  criticism that shifts the topos of  art’s
imitation of  nature onto the social plane. By supplanting the idea that
art or music reproduces an existing thing, the paradox that a work’s
suspension of the real is the condition for its redescription opens a
path that leads beyond the poetic conceit that absolute music speaks a
“language beyond language” to the expression of  a world that
reverberates with its unique tone.
The objection that music’s expression of  a feeling or mood is
a remnant of  the nineteenth century’s cult of  art religion overlooks the
fact that the tone or mood of  a work has an ontological significance.
Moods and feelings anchor our sense of  participating in the world to
which we belong by attuning us to it. As a “state-of-mind,” mood
delivers the fact of  our being over to the manner in which we inhabit
the world. According to Heidegger, mood is equiprimordial with
understanding in that it discloses this manner of being “prior to all
cognition and volition, and beyond their range of  disclosure.”19 By
bringing the fact of  our existing in the world before us, our states-of-
mind reveal how our attunement to the world is a condition for our
engagement with it. We only “encounter something that matters to us”
in having a state-of-mind. This state-of–mind, which “implies a
disclosive submission to the world,” also opens us to it.20 By assailing
us, the mood in which we find ourselves disposed toward the world
and others makes it possible to direct ourselves toward it and them.
By identifying mood with the attunement of a state-of-mind
to a world that we inhabit with others and filled with objects and things,
Heidegger’s existential-ontological analysis frees music’s affective quality
from theories of  expression in which expression is the representation
of  emotions embodied in music. To the extent that having a state-of-
mind is the condition for encountering the world at all, the possibility
of  having a world depends on the fact that we first encounter the
world in the way we are disposed toward it. Correlatively, the idea that
poetic discourse aims at expressing feelings and moods that have no
prior referent in reality links music’s nonrepresentational status with a
work’s ontological vehemence. For Heidegger, in “poetical discourse,
the communication of  the existential possibilities of  one’s state-of-
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mind can become an aim in itself, and this amounts to a disclosing of
existence.”21 The exploration in music of  singular feelings and moods
opens the world to us anew. In turn, the poetic redescription of  our
inherence in the world by moods and feelings created by individual
works augments the affective depths of  our human finitude.
The recovery of  feeling’s poetic quality from the ruinous
opposition between knowledge’s denotative and art’s connotative
functions shifts the burden of  a theory of  music’s communicability
from decoding a content contained within music’s formal features and
structural processes to explicating the experience of  the fit between a
work and its expression. By giving a figure to feelings, the exemplification
in music of  singular moods and feelings anchors music in dimensions
of  our experiences that precede the objectification of  reality. In this
light, music’s nonrepresentational character is the correlate of  its mimetic
relation to the affective field in which our experiences of  belonging to
the world are anchored.
The idea that, of  all the arts, music is the one that is not mimetic
bears out the difference between music’s relation to this affective field
and narrative’s imitation of  action. By resisting the assimilation of  music
to narrative, Ricoeur indicates the place of  music’s depiction of  feelings
and moods in relation to the practical field of  our experiences. By
constructing worlds of  “singular essences in the realm of  feeling,”22
individual works push back the boundaries of  our affective experiences
by modulating our elective affinities with the world. Unlike the act of
knowing, which gives rise to the subject-object duality, feeling manifests
“a relation to the world that constantly restores our complicity with
it.”23 According to Ricoeur, feeling unites an “intention toward the
world and an affection of  the self.”24 Consequently, feeling’s general
function is to interiorize the reality that we objectify over against
ourselves in coming to know and master reality. By suspending ordinary
feelings and emotions, poetic feelings augment this affective dimension
of  our experiences by assimilating us to the meaning displayed by a
metaphor, poem or musical work. Through this epoché of  bodily
emotions where, according to Ricoeur we otherwise “live” our bodies
in a more intense way, poetic feelings accompany and complete the
work of  imagination by making the thought (dianoia) schematized by a
work our own.25 The mood structured by a poem or musical work raises
ordinary emotions and feelings above themselves by means of their poetic
transposition; the ontological vehemence of  this poetic transposition of
feeling acquires its full force through our re-attunement to the world.
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Music and the Limits of  Narrative
The fact that the “elevation of  feeling to fiction is the condition
of  its mimetic use”26 conjoins a reflection on the limits of  narrative to
one on music’s significance with respect to the experiences of  non-
mastery that inhere in the condition of  human finitude. For Ricoeur,
the multiplication of  limit-experiences “worthy of  being placed under
the sign of  eternity”27 stems from the singular quality each work unfolds:
“it is in a different possible world that time allows itself  to be surpassed
by eternity.”28 As the art of  narration draws near the inscrutability of
time, and as “time, escaping our will to mastery, surges forth on the
side of  what, in one way or another, is the true master of  meaning,”29
the imaginative explorations of  our being-affected, which Ricoeur
suggests occurs in music in a pure state, reply in their own ways to the
enigma of  time’s ultimate unrepresentability.30 Beyond the limit of  tales
of  time and the other of  time, music’s redescription of  our elective
affinities with the world bears witness to the ontological difference
attested by the aporia of  time’s inscrutability.31
Music takes its measure of  time’s ultimate inscrutability through
its mimetic refiguration of  the depths of  feeling that arise in response
to this difference. In his reflections on our affective fragility, Ricoeur
remarks that “‘[m]oods’ alone can manifest the coincidence of the
transcendent, in accordance with intellectual determinations, and the
inward, in accordance with the order of  existential movement.”32 The
height of  the feeling that replies to the demand by reason for the
Unconditioned attests to the difference between being and beings:
If  being is that which beings are not, anguish is the feeling
par excellence of  ontological difference. . . . Joy attests
that we have a part of  us linked to this very lack of  being
in beings. That is why Spiritual Joy. . . designate[s]. . . the
only affective ‘mood’ worthy of  being called ontological.
Anguish is only its underside of  absence and distance. If
man is capable . . . of  Joy in and through anguish, that is
the radical principle of  all ‘disproportion’ in the dimension
of  feeling and the source of  man’s affective fragility.33
This principle authorizes the mimesis in music of  the radical passivity
evidenced by the enigma of  time and its other. Through its poetic
redescriptions of  the disproportion in the dimension of  feeling between
our part in being and the lack we experience in the face of  our
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nonmastery of  time, music expresses the pathos and joy of  our mortal
dwelling.
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kind of  intentionality. They are not merely inner states but interiorized
thoughts. It is as such that they accompany and complete the work of
imagination as schematizing a synthetic operation: they make the schematized
thought ours. . . . Feeling is not contrary to thought. It is thought made ours.
This felt participation is a part of  its complete meaning as a poem.”
26 Paul Ricoeur, Rule of  Metaphor, p. 245. Accordingly, the
“phenomenological objectivity of  what commonly is called emotion or feeling
is inseparable from the tensional structure of  the truth of  metaphorical
statements that express the construction of  the world by and with feeling.
The possibility of  textural reality is correlative to the possibility of  a
metaphorical truth of  a poetic schematization; the possibility of  one is
established at the same time as that of  the other” (p. 255). In Ricoeur’s view,
mood is the “hypothetical created by the poem . . . that, as such, occupies the
place in lyric poetry that muthos occupies in tragic poetry.” Hence, lyric muthos
“is joined by a lyric mimesis, in the sense that mood created in this fashion is a
sort of  model for “seeing as’ and ‘feeling as’” (p. 245).
27 Ricoeur, Time and Narrative vol. 3, p. 271.
28 Ricoeur, Time and Narrative vol. 3, p. 271.
29 Ricoeur, Time and Narrative vol. 3, p. 261.
30 Ricoeur, Time and Narrative vol. 3, p. 271; see Ricoeur, Critique and
Conviction, p. 174.
31 Ricoeur, Time and Narrative vol. 3. In the closing pages of  this
final volume, Ricoeur comments that the distinction Heidegger draws between
the temporal and temporalizing has but a single function, which is to point to
the ontological difference between Being and beings. This difference evidences
the radical nature of  human finitude by indicating temporality’s inscrutable
character: “Apart from this role, it [the ontological difference between Being
and beings] only succeeds in indicating the inscrutable character of  temporality
understood as the wholeness of  Dasein. For, taken by itself, the distinction
between temporal-being and temporality no longer designates a phenomenon
accessible to hermeneutic phenomenology as such” (p. 270).
32 Ricoeur, Fallible Man, p. 106.
33 Ricoeur, Fallible Man, p. 106. Original emphasis. Ricoeur explains that
“[i]f  being is ‘beyond essence,’ if  it is horizon, it is understandable that the feelings
that most radically interiorize the supreme intention of reason might themselves
be beyond form. . . . . The height of  the feeling of belonging to being ought to be
the feeling in which what is most detached from our vital depth—what is absolute,
in the strongest sense of the word—becomes the heart of  our heart. But then one
cannot name it; one can merely call it the Unconditional that is demanded by
reason and whose inwardness is manifested by feeling” (pp. 105 – 106).
